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SOME FACETS OF STRICT TORTIOUS LIABILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Harry H. Ognall*

INTRODUCTION

Liability in the absence of fault is no novelty to the common
law.' From the year 1868, and the final decision in Rylands v.
Fletcher,2 this doctrine has been much discussed by legal theorists on both sides of the Atlantic. Even students of the civil
law have taken part in the ventilation. 3 Nevertheless, it seems
fair to say that much wearisome repetition has not dulled the
edge of controversy. One may note that consideration of the
subject immediately brings forth divergent views as to terminology; some writers believe that inasmuch as this part of the
law is riddled with exceptions,4 the term "absolute" is too rigid

to describe this liability, and that "strict" is a better term. Since
the whole discussion seems rather sterile, therefore, without innuendo, it is proposed to use the term "strict" hereafter.
* B.A. (Oxon.); LL.M., University of Virginia, 1957.
SWigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts-Its History, 7 HARv. L. REv.
315, 383, 441 (1894).
2 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
3 See Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modern Civil and Comnzon
Law, 16 ILL. L. REv. 163, 268; 17 ILL. L. Rlnv. 187, 416 (1920-23).
4 PROSSER, SE-LECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 135 (1954).
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That the strict liability concept is significant cannot be disputed. One writer' has listed over sixteen manifestations of it in
modem law. Nor, it is to be noted, is this significance confined to
the law of torts; there is a growing trend to uphold criminal
statutes which lay down no requirement of fault 6 and, seemingly,
7
strict liability may be imposed by contract.
Professor Takayanagi8 has made an interesting analysis of the
causes of the rise to prominence of strict liability; he suggests
that the development of commerce, the use of motor power, and
the sharp distinction between rich and poor are among many
important factors. It seems that these technological changes have
combined with the paternalistic philosophy of the 20th century
to remove much of the emphasis on personal delinquency which
was the product of the 19th century individualism. 9 Interestingly,
at almost exactly the same time that strict liability became a real
issue, negligence as an independent tort was crystallizing in
England. 10 As will later be shown in discussing the relationship
of negligence to strict liability, many contend that had negligence
as a tort arisen twenty years earlier, strict liability might never
have achieved its present significance.
It is the object of this article to consider the acceptance in the
United States of the strict liability concept and to show that such
acceptance is causing a cogent re-appraisal of traditional notions
within the law of torts. In so doing, no attempt will be made to
discuss the more obvious applications of strict liability long
known to the common law, such as liability for fire, cattle trespass or damage by animals "ferae naturae."
Rylands v. Fletcher- Home and Abroad
The "Red House Colliery Case" of Rylands v. Fletcher decided
nothing radically new. The defendants constructed a reservoir
upon their land; and upon the site chosen for this purpose there
were five disused and filled-up shafts of an old coal mine, the
Carpenter, The Doctrine of Green v. General Petroleum Corporation, 5 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 263 (1932).
6

7
R
16 Ill.
9

HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 282-97 (1947).

Keefer v. Lombardi, 376 Pa. 367, 102 A.2d 695 (1954).
Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modern Civil and Common Law,
L. REv. 268 (1921).

Note, 13 NOTRE DAME LAW. 226, 233 (1937). "The Scholastic idea that the
individual is a moral unit and hence a political unit having equal responsibilities
to his fellow men has promulgated the philosophical basis for a renewal of the
rules of absolute liability."
10 Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
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passages of which communicated with the adjoining mine of the
plaintiff. The mine shafts were not discovered during construction of the reservoir and no precautions were taken. When the
reservoir was filled, water escaped down the shafts and through
the passages, flooding plaintiff's mine.
The decision in the first instance of Rylands v. Fletcher was
reversed the following year; this latter decision itself was affirmed
by the House of Lords.
In argument for a decision in the first instance, counsel for the
plaintiff relied on the doctrine of trespass and the remarks of
Blackburn, J. in In re Williams v. Groucott," but the court
rejected his argument on the grounds that there was no fault,
nor technically was there a trespass or a nuisance.' 2 In dissent,
Bramwell, B. said there was no need for any of these requirements, citing Backhouse v. Bonomil s and the long record of
liability for the spread of fire. To show that the question before
the court was no novelty, the court referred to Chadwick v.
Trower,14 decided twenty-five years earlier.' 5
The case was appealed and Blackburn, J. delivered the judgment of the court.'
The question of law therefore arises, what is the obligation
which the law casts on a person who ... lawfully brings on his
land something which, though harmless whilst it remains there,
will naturally do mischief if it escapes out of his land ...
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for
his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep
it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence
of its escape.

He supported his statement by citing Holt, C. J. in Tenant v.
Goldwin,'1 7 decided in 1705. In the House of Lords,' 8 Blackburn's decision was upheld.
11

4 B. & S. 149, 122 Eng. Rep. 416 (K.B. 1863).

12

3 H. & C. 775, 149 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865).

13 9 H.L.C. 503, 11 Eng. Rep. 825 (1861).
14 6 Bing. N.C. 1, 133 Eng. Rep. 1 (C.P. 1841).
15 It should be noted that Pollock, C.B. (with the majority) added that the
negligence of the contractors in not discovering the mine shafts had not been
sufficiently established to form a ground of judgment. This seems sufficient rebuttal
of those who still insist that Rylands v. Fletcher was really a negligence case. See,
Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARv. L. REV. 801 (1916). It was not until

eleven years later that an English court held that an employer might be liable for
the negligence of an independent contractor. Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876)!
16 L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866).
17 Isalk. 21, 91 Eng. Rep. 20 (1705).
18 L.R. 3 H.L.R. 330 (1868).
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Though the break of the wall and the ensuing escape in this
case appears to have been capable of supporting a legitimate
averment of trespass, its significance is that Blackburn made
no attempt to distinguish it. He thought it was direct authority
for his decision. We have here a decision which seemed to those
involved in it to be far from "epochal in its consequences,"19
yet it aroused almost instant controversy. Some attempted to
"explain the case away" on the grounds of negligence, as has
already been shown. Some attempted to justify it on sociological
grounds.2" It seems, however, in the light of the rise of negligence, enhanced by the mechanization of the century, a case
such as Rylands v. Fletcher was bound to stand out for all to
observe, for the case occupied a most ambiguous territory, suspended between that which was clearly wrongful and that which
was absolved from all blame. Its significance came from no
consciously motivated policy of the mid-Victorian judges who
decided it, but purely from its place in the time track of legal
development. Rylands v. Fletcher came to be seen as an affront
to the growing fault concept. This was particularly true of its
immediate reception in the United States. In Massachusetts 2 and
Minnesota2 2 it was accepted; but this was not the beginning of
2"
2 -4
a trend, for New York, 23 New Hampshire and New Jersey
immediately rejected the decision.
The reason for the mixed reception given Rylands v. Fletcher
in the United States lay in the forms of action. The long established common law rule was that no question of fault was relevant in a writ of trespass, while it was vitally significant in the
writ sur le cas for consequential damage. American courts were
very conscious of this distinction; through the use of it they
could "flirt" with the idea of strict liability, yet still purport to
reject it.2" Decisions in two early cases decided in the courts of
New York are typical of this enigmatic performance. Hay v. The
19 Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts - Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV.
441, 454 (1894).
20 Molloy, Fletcher v. Rylands - A Reexamination of Juristic Origins, 9 U. CHI.
L. REV. 266 (1941); Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REV.
298, 373, 423 (1911); Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 564,
574 (1952).
21 Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582, 97 Am. Dec. 56 (1868).
22 Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1871).
23 Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
24 Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
25 Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876).
26 Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. RaV. 359
(1951).
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Cohoes Co. 2 7 imposed strict liability for damages caused by

blasting. The court stated that since there had been a trespass
to property, fault need not be proved. Yet in Booth v. Rome W.
and 0. T. R. Co. 28 strict liability was rejected, not as such, but
on the ground that the damage was consequential, and, therefore,
negligence had to be proved.
In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 9 Cardozo referred to the
decision in The Cohoes Co. case as "a rare exception, survival
for the most part of an ancient form of liability . .." Yet, in
that same year a California court 30 seems to have found in Hay
v. The Cohoes Co. the moral support it needed for imposing
strict liability under the guise of trespass through the use of the
sic utere tuo ut alienum non Jaedas concept. In Luthringer v.
Moore31 it was specifically pointed out that Green v. General
Petroleum Corp.32 had enunciated a principle of strict liability
without fault.
All jurisdictions have not approached the problem in this way.
In some instances there have been outright acceptances 33 or
rejections of Rylands v. Fletcher. Even so, Prosser3 4 seems to
come close to the mark when he suggests that many of those
cases rejecting Rylands v. Fletcher would in fact be exempt in
England under one of the recognized English exceptions to that
case. In Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.,3 5 for example, the Texas
court rejects Rylands v. Fletcher and then goes on to point out
that oil well drainage pools are in any event outside the scope
of that case, because a person using his land in Texas to store the
salt water drainage of an oil well would not be a non-natural user
of that land. On the other hand, according to the Texas court,
"England is a pluvial country, where constant streams and
abundant rains make the storage of water unnecessary for ordinary or general purposes." 6
Study would seem to show that the strict liability doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher has made substantial inroads on tort con2 N.Y.159 (1849).
140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893).
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
30 Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
31 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
32 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
33 For a complete list see PROSSER, TORTS c. 9 (2d ed., 1955).
34 PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 135 (1954).
35 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
36 96 S.W.2d at 225.
27
28
29
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cepts within the United States. In the remainder of the article,
the writer will attempt to show the validity of a statement by
Professor Molloy that:
Whatever the abstraction by which the decision has been
justified or attacked, the importance of Fletcher v. Rylands
lies in its reaffirmation of the "medieval" principle of action at
peril, a concept strongly reflected in the trend of modern case
37
law and legislation in an ever-increasing number of fields.

I.

THE ACCEPTANCE OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY

A.

Under the Guise of Nuisance
"Nuisance, unhappily, has been a sort of legal garbage can,""s
and it is for this reason that it is ideally suited to having its
heterogeneous applications cover concepts which should stand
on their own feet. Through the use of this concept, courts in the
United States have been able to bring about a Rylands v. Fletcher
result without expressly accepting that case, and in many instances while discrediting it. Thus, in Turner v. Big Lake Oil
Co.,3 the court purported to reject the principle of Rylands v.
Fletcher, but it did admit a principle of absolute nuisance. In
the New York case of Heeg v. Licht4 ° in which the defendant
was held strictly liable under the guise of nuisance for the
explosion of gunpowder stored for making fireworks, there would
also have been clear liability had Rylands v. Fletcher been the
standard.
In Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas-Light Co.,4 the court says, "But
where the damage is the necessary consequence of just what the
defendant is doing, or is incident to the business itself, or to the
manner in which it is conducted, the law of negligence has no
application, and the law of nuisance applies." Interestingly,
Sweet v. State42 in referring to Bohan substituted for the term
"nuisance," the term "strict liability. 4 3 The West Virginia
Supreme Court in deciding Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond 44 used the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to find a nuisance
based on negligence and in effect applied strict liability. Green
37 Molloy, Fletcher v. Rylands-A Reexamination of Juristic Origins, 9 U. CHI.
L. REv. 266, 267 (1941).
38 Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REv. 399, 410 (1942).
39

40
41

42
43

44

128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
80 N.Y. 579 (1880).
122 N.Y. 18, 25 N.E. 246, 47 (1890).
195 Misc. 494, 89 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Ct. C1. 1948).
89 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
68 W.Va. 530, 70 S.E. 126 (1911).
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v. Petroleum Corp. is another good example. There, it will be
remembered, the court talked vaguely about sic utere tuo. It
then referred to Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co.4 5 which was a nuisance case. In a Louisiana decision
it was said that a defendant who, although engaged in a lawful
business conducted according to modem and approved methods
and with reasonable care, causes risk and peril (not even
damage) by such
activities may be liable under the doctrine of
46
strict liability.
In so many ways are the nature of things classed as nuisances
akin to Rylands v. Fletcher that one authority has sweepingly
declared, "there is in fact no case applying Rylands v. Fletcher
which is not duplicated in all essential respects by some American decision which proceeds on the theory of nuisance, and it is
quite evident that under that name the principle is universally
''4
accepted. 1
And another writer 48 described the two by stating that nuisance and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher are related like the
intersecting segments of circles. Why they are so closely akin is a
difficult question to answer. It would seem that their common
denominator lies either in the fact of "control" of the offensive
instrumentality by the defendant, or in the judgment that one
who adopts dangerous methods in the cause of progress must
assume the risk inherent in them.49 It is clear, however, that the
courts have availed themselves of this close affinity between the
two and have used nuisance to disguise what was in reality an
adoption of strict liability.
B.

Negligence and Strict Liability
It was stated earlier that had the concept of negligence as an
independent tort risen at an earlier date, Rylands v. Fletcher
would never have achieved its present importance. This section
is an attempt to consider the justification for such a belief and to
discern the present relationship between negligence and strict

liability.

294 Fed. 597 (8th Cir. 1923).
Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955).
PROSSER, TORTS § 59 af 337-38 (2d ed. 1955).
Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q.R. 37 (1926).
49 See Hickey v. McCabe, 30 R.I. 346, 75 Ad. 404 (1910); Bohan v. Port
Jervis Gas-Light Co., 122 N.Y. 18, 25 N.E. 246 (1890).
45

46
47
48
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From a theoretical viewpoint there is much in common between the objectivity of strict liability and that of the "reasonable
man." In his book, The Common Law, Holmes says:
But as the law has grown, even when its standards have continued to model themselves upon those of morality, they have
necessarily become external, because they have considered not
the actual condition of the particular defendant, but whether
his conduct would have been wrong in the fair average member
of the community, whom he is expected to equal at his peril. 50

And Professor W. G. Friedmann stresses that negligence is itself
not concerned with states of mind, but with standards of conduct
and it is thus moving toward a social insurance principle. 51 The
idea of a high duty of care which almost turns an actor into an
insurer 52 is nothing strange, yet it does seem to stretch the concept of negligence too far in an effort to produce socially desirable results. The danger of this has been effectively pointed out
by one writer:
[T]his diluted doctrine [i.e., diluted negligence doctrine], unless
carefully administered, is likely to effect too broad an extension
of liability in cases involving the negligent behavior of "small
people" in the "back-yard" cases, which should be disposed
of only under the "moral" version of the foreseeability test.
Indeed, it might even effect too broad a liability in litigation
against organized enterprise because of its failure to emphasize
as the focal point for determining the liability of particular
enter'prises the "typical" nature of the hazard involved or of the
53
harm ensuing.

Many of the "operative" requirements are the same for both
negligence and strict liability. By operative requirements it is
meant those factors which must be present in order to sustain an
allegation either of negligence or strict liability. The duty of
care involved in both strict liability and negligence extends to a
theoretically infinite number of persons (provided they are foreseeable). If one examines cases such as Klepsch v. Donald54 and
Houghton v. Loma PrietaLumber Co.,5 5 one sees strict liability
restricted to the general class of persons threatened, and in a
Privy Council opinion in 1902"6 the law lords also applied the
,0
51

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 162 (1881).
Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HARv.

L. REv. 241 (1949).
52 Cardozo, C.J. in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 16 N.E. 99,
100 (1928) (dictum).
53 Note, 8 U. Cmi. L. REv. 729, 737 (1941).
54 Klepsch v. Donald, 4 Wash. 436, 30 Pac. 991 (f892).
55 152 Cal. 500, 93 Pac. 82 (1907).
56 Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Cos., [1902]
A.C. 891.
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limitation that the harm ensuing from a Rylands v. Fletcher
situation must be one of a general class of harms threatened.
These two limitations are exactly the same as those in negligence
cases. Professor James, 57 in referring to the foreseeability requirement, makes the interesting point that if foreseeability of the
risk involved in carrying on the activity is a prerequisite to insurance (which it surely is), and if insurance is necessary to
enable the activity to carry on at all (which it is), "it must be
present before absolute liability can be imposed, and is therefore a necessary element in any adequate absolute liability doctrine." Prima facie this would seem to assimilate negligence
(based on duty which is in turn based on foreseeability) with
strict liability, and indeed they come close; but a basic difference
lies in the fact that while damage ensuing from strict liability is
the result of a calculated act, tolerated by society, damage from
negligence is not. Despite this, one finds counsel in the Whitman
case 58 along with Justices Baldwin and O'Sullivan (dissentiente)
agreeing that the phrase "in such a way as will necessarily or
obviously expose the person of another to the danger of probable
injury" imports a degree of negligence. 59 More likely the phrase,
and so the majority considered, is a causal explanation relating
the act to the damage. Even here one can see again why errors
arise, since causation problems are common both to negligence
and strict liability. It is one more of the operative facts mentioned earlier.6 0 For this reason it is difficult to agree with Professor Harper 6 ' when he suggests that in order to differentiate
negligence and strict liability one should concentrate more on
the consequences of conduct rather than on the conduct itself,
for neither the conduct nor the consequences seem to be so
radically different in either concept. It is the mental attitude
behind the conduct and the attitude of society which is important.
The theoretical relationship between negligence and strict
liability is only half of the story, for the courts, too, have played
an active part. Their way of approaching it has been different.
It is true that the courts have made no attempt to "dovetail"
57 Comment, Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities, 37 CAL. L. Ryv.
269 (1949).
58 Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliot & Watrous Engineering Co., 137 Conn. 562,
79 A.2d 591 (1951).
59 Louden v. Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 NE. 970 (1914).
60

61

Maddseen v. East Jordon Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942).
Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30 MICH. L. REv.

1001 (1932).
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negligence and strict liability in theory; what they have done is
to apply the theory of negligence to yield
the practicalresult of
6
strict liability. Thus Professor Feezer : 1
Without abandoning what Professor Green calls the "theology
of negligence", they have found it possible to place responsibility on defendants for harms unimagined by the judges who
first formulated those doctrines, although the doctrines invoked
were the rationalization of decisions which denied recovery
and left the loss with the plaintiff who had sustained it.

This seems substantially borne out by cases considering the duty
of care owed by electric companies. One such case was Chase v.
Washington Water Power Co.6 3 in which an action was brought
against the electric company for the burning of plaintiff's barn.
Chicken hawks had interlocked talons while engaged in an aerial
battle and while so interlocked one touched a high-tension transmission line and the other a guy wire. The birds thus formed the
connecting link through which electricity passed to the guy wire.
The guy wire touched a barbed wire fence and through this
electricity was transmitted to the farmer's barn, which was destroyed by fire. The company was held guilty of negligence in
permitting the uninsulated guy wire to remain in contact with
the fence wire and could not be absolved from liability merely
because it had spaced the transmission line and guy wire twentyeight inches apart in accordance with the accepted standard.
Negligence was the ground for liability in S. W. Gas and Electric Co. v. Lain6 4 where a man, standing on top of an oil tank
between eleven and thirteen feet under a wire, touched the wire
with a twenty foot "riser" pole he was withdrawing from the tank,
and was fatally electrocuted. And in Wise v. Southern Indiana
Gas and Electric Co. 65 a youth of sixteen with a mental age of
twelve sued successfully on a negligence count after he had
illegally climbed eighteen feet of bridge superstructure and
touched sagging high-tension wires. The court on the one hand
talked of knowledge of the presence of trespassers as barring a
defense on that ground; and then, on the other hand, said that
the trespass could not go in mitigation of liability because the
defendants did not own the bridge.

62

Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types

of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. .L. Rzv. 805, 810 (1930).
63 62 Idaho 298, 111 P.2d 872 (1941).
64 139 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1943).
65 109 Ind. App. 681, 34 N.E.2d 975 (1941).
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Plaintiff recovered in Polk v. Los Angeles,"6 even though he
had seen signs warning him that high-voltage wires passed
through trees, and had nonetheless proceeded to prune them7
without using rubber gloves or an insulated pruning instrument.1
These cases seem also to be a part of a trend in tort law in
the United States which was summed up by a writer when he
said:
I have noticed . .. a marked tendency in negligence cases to

allow a case to go to the jury when the allegation of negligence
is sustained, if at all, by a mere scintilla of evidence. [The idea
that he who is at fault shall be liable has been] replaced by a
philosophy that one who is injured shall recover.68

This philosophy can also be discerned in master-servant cases
in suits brought against the master on grounds of respondeat
superior. Discrepancy will often be noted in the inconsistent
treatment accorded the master and the servant. In Strickfaden
v. Greencreek Highway Dist., 69 the verdict of the jury against
the defendant was upheld by the Supreme Court of Idaho, notwithstanding a simultaneous verdict in favour of the foreman,
for whose negligence the defendant was held liable. The court
justified itself by citing a number of cases which seem either to
suggest that the jury in finding for the individual was wrong, or
that such a finding is not relevant. 70
A further method of utilizing the concept of negligence has
appeared in some of the blasting cases. The premise here seems
to be that since negligence is only a question of degree anything
7
can be brought within its scope. Thus, in Simonton v. Loring '
the court says:
The rule of ordinary care affords reasonable freedom in the
use as well as reasonable security in the protection of property.
For the degree of care which the rule imposes must be in proportion to the extent of injury which will be likely to result
should it prove insufficient ....[O]rdinary care wholly depends
on the particular facts of each case ....

26 Cal.2d 519, 159 P.2d 931 (1945).
See also Ottertail Power Co. v. Duncan, 137 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1943); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bookley & Co., 117 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1941); Ward v.
New York State Elec. and Gas Corp., 290 N.Y. 325, 49 N.E.2d 159 (1943); Eldredge,
Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L. Q. 32 (1937).
68 McCord, Are You Your Brother'sKeeper?, 1950 INS. L. J.709.
69 42 Idaho 738, 248 Pac. 456 (1926).
70 See also Judd v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 55 Idaho 461, 44 P.2d 291 (1935);
Sandro v. Missoula Light & Water Co., 48 Mont. 226, 136 Pac. 211 (1913); Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Clark, 65 Miss. 691, 38 So. 97 (1905).
71 68 Me.164, 165 (1878).
66
67
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Again in Simon v. Henry7 2 Mr. Justice Dixon says:
[B]lasting close by a buildng necessarily would require a
high degree of care - perhaps the highest degree of care
[whatever he means by this?] ....

It all comes under the term

"reasonable," after all, depending upon all the circumstances
surrounding it.
So, in Fitzsimmons & Connell Co. v. Braun73 (a blasting case),

Boggs, J. cites Thompson on Negligence as stating that where
blasting is done, say, in a populous city, damages are recoverable
without proof of negligence, for the reason that in such a case
the work is so inherently dangerous that the doing of it, no matter how carefully, is of itself negligence. 4 It has already been
shown that it would seem not to be negligence, since it is tolerated by society, provided damages are paid.
The whole process is described by Holmes75 with his usual
clarity:
[R]ules which seem to lie outside of culpability in any
sense have sometimes been referred to as remote fault, while
others which have started from the general notion of negligence
may with equal ease be referred to some extrinsic ground of
policy.

And so, surprising though it may seem to those who first saw
Rylands v. Fletcher as an affront to the fault concept, it has been
through the idea of a rather distorted "fault" that it has made
much of its progress. Two courts have aptly stated the problem.
In his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
Judge Traynor concluded:
It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is really liability without negligence.
If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be rethere is no
sponsible for their quality regardless of reason
76
reason not to fix that responsibility openly.

In Wilkerson v. McCarthy, Trustees,77 where a railroad was held
liable to the plaintiff employee for injury from crossing a plank
over a pit, even though the defendants had put up posts and

62 N.J.L. 486, 41 At. 692 (1898).
199 IM.390, 65 N.E. 249, 251 (1902).
74 Though it is possible that this particular decision proceeded on the basis
that the defendants engaged in blasting operations when they had been told not to
do so.
75 HOLMES, ThE COMMON LAW c. 3 (1881).
76 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
77 336 U.S. 53 (1948).
72
73
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chains to prevent just such an entry into the area, Mr. Justice
Jackson in dissent stated:
I am not unaware that even in this opinion the Court continues to pay lip service to the doctrine that liability in these cases
is to be based only upon fault. But its standard of fault is such

in this case as to indicate that the principle is without much
practical meaning ....
[I]f this Court considers a reform of this law appropriate,
and within the judicial power to promulgate, I do7 not
see why it
8

6should constantly deny that it is doing just that.
C.

Strict Liability and Res Ipsa Loquitur
"Res ipsa loquitur," which originated with the 19th century
English decision in Byrne v. Boadle,79 is a type of evidence permitted under certain circumstances to raise an inference or a
presumption of negligence. The first circumstance is that there
must be an accident which would normally not occur without
negligence on someone's part. Secondly, there must be no voluntary contribution by the plaintiff; and finally, the factor(s)
causing the accident must be within the exclusive control of the
defendant.8 0 These requirements have allowed courts to use res
ipsa to cloak the application of strict liability. Thus, in Prentiss
v. NationalAirlines,8 1 a New Jersey statute which imposes strict
liability for civil airline crashes resulting in damage to persons
or property on the ground when the injured party is not negligent was held constitutional and justified on the ground that it
is impossible in about seventy per cent of airline crashes for the
plaintiff to prove what actually caused the accident.
The major proponent of the use of res ipsa loquitur to effectuate strict liability was Professor Thayer. s2 He contended that
Rylands v. Fletcher is rendered almost completely impotent by
exceptions such as "act of God" and "act of a stranger" which
may be pleaded in defense; and that it will only be an effective
legal principle when the defense of negligence precludes the
pleading of these exceptions. In view of this, he thought that
what remains of "pure" Rylands v. Fletcher could be classed
merely as a high duty of care, with the difficulty of getting evidence of "what goes on" on a neighbour's land overcome by the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Id. At 76.
2 H & C., 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
80 PRossER, ToRTs 201 (2d ed. 1955).
s1 112 F. Supp. 306 (D.N.J. 1953).
82 Thayer, Liability Without Fault. 29 IARv. L. REv. 801 (1916).
78
70
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Co.,8 3 plaintiff waitress was injured when a bottle exploded in
her hand through no apparent cause. Although witnesses were
called to prove that these bottles underwent the most rigorous
testing at pressures far above that under which they were normally filled, the majority of the court held the defendants liable
under res ipsa. Mr. Justice Traynor, in dissenting, was a little
more frank:
In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has
placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
84
beings.

Another clear manifestation of this use of the doctrine occurs
in its application to multiple defendants. Under res ipsa, the
defendant has always been allowed to rebut the allegation that
he was negligent. One of the most effective ways of doing this
is to show that somebody else was. Now, however, such a legitimate escape has been precluded in some courts by the procedural
device of allowing plaintiff to join all possible negligent parties
as defendants and recover from all of them. In Litzmann v.
Humboldt County8 5 a minor picked up an aerial bomb lying in
a fairground. It exploded, and he was injured. On appeal it
was held that if the jury were unable to determine which of two
defendants were guilty of actionable negligence, both defendants
should be held liable under res ipsa. A patient was injured while
unconscious as a result of the use of an anaesthetic in Ybarra v.
Spangards° and res ipsa was applied to all the defendants in the
hospital who could have injured him. It does seem, however,
that the California Supreme Court was "feeling" for some restriction on the use of res ipsa in this manner when it decided
this case, in so far as it seemed to require some "community
of interest" among the defendants so joined. In La Rocco v.
Fernandez,s7 in Colorado, res ipsa was applied to the drivers of
two cars where the death of the driver of a third car was caused
by an unascertained one of them; and, in Loch v. Confair,8 8 a
res ipsa case was allowed to go to the jury where either retailer
or bottler or both appeared prima facie negligent. These de83

24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).

14

Id. at 440.

85

273 P.2d 82 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1954).
25 Cal.2d 496, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
130 Col. 504, 277 P.2d 232 (1954).
372 Pa. 326, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
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cisions by no means stand alone, 9 and the question arises whether the use of res ipsa in this fashion is a legitimate one.
The answer to this would appear to depend to a great extent
on one's analysis of that doctrine itself. Does the use of the res

ipsa merely create an inference sufficient to get the case before
the jury, but no more, or does it raise a presumption? Only if it
is the latter can it properly be used to apply strict liability in the
manner suggested by Thayer. A number of American decisions
have treated it as a presumption of negligence which must be
rebutted as such;90 but Prosser says that such an attitude is fast
disappearing. 9 1 In 1913 the United States Supreme Court treated
res ipsa loquitur as a mere permissible inference. 2
While res ipsa loquitur will in many instances bring about the
same result as would the application of strict liability in the same
situation, it will not always affect such a result. The doctrine of
res ipsa only applies when the unexplained accident ordinarily
would not have happened in the absence of negligence, while
strict liability is predicated on a risk which the utmost care could
not have obviated. Also, a defendant in a negligence action
only has to show that he was not negligent, whereas in strict
liability cases he has to show positively some authorized defense
such as an act of God. Therefore, while it has been shown that
res ipsa loquitur has been used as an instrument of policy to impose strict liability, those decisions which reject its use in this
fashion better serve the cause of clarity. The rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher is both historically prior to and separate from negligence and res ipsa in its origin, and is grounded in policy, while
negligence is and should be grounded in fault. As Ehrenzweig
has said of this twisting of negligence, nuisance, and res ipsa loquitor, "Greater instability and uncertainty may result from
such precedent stretching than from an open rejection of earlier
cases, and an outright recognition of absolute liability." 98
D.

ProductsLiability
The scope of liability attaching to the sale of harmful goods,

89 See also, Kansas City F.S. & M. Ry. v. Stoner, 49 Fed. 209 (8th Cir. 1892);
Pearlman v. King Lumber Co., 302 IM. App. 190, 23 N.E.2d 826 (1939).
90 Shecter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947); Kearner v. Tanner
Co., 31 I1. 203, 76 AUt. 833 (1910); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hadley, 170
Ind. 204, 34 N.E. 13 (1908); Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law
Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV.307, 316 (1920).
91 PROSSER, ToRTs 213 (2d ed. 1955).
92 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S.233 (1913).
93

EnRENzwato, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 27 (1951).
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i.e., products liability, is also of much concern today.9 4 Through
the use of implied warranty and by the extension of traditional
tort concepts the result has been to place strict liability on the
manufacturers in many instances. In the implied warranty cases,
it seems that the courts are more able to get around the overly restrictive Winterbottom v. Wright" privity requirement 9
through the implementation of a third party beneficiary theory:
"[A]ny implied warranty action available to a buyer in a twoparty contract of sale is equally available to third parties, or to
as the intended
a class of third parties who are clearly designated
97
beneficiaries of a multi-party transaction.
In England several interesting developments have taken place
in this field. The first attempt to have anything like a third party
beneficiary died with the "constructive trust" theory in 1933,98
and a second abortive attempt by the Law Revision Committee 9
went the same way. However, through Adler v. Dickson 0 0 and
Pyrene v. Scindia' ° ' a new doctrine has arisen that where by
"necessary implication" a third party is to play some part in the
contract he is entitled to all benefits of that contract and is subject
to all its burdens.
In addition to the use of the third party beneficiary doctrine,
the privity necessity is being avoided by a resort to legal history.
Thus, Judge Traynor in 1944,102 citing Ames, "The History of
Assumpsit,"'10 stated that the action for breach of warranty was
originally tortious, and only late in its history was a remedy in
assumpsit permitted. 10 4 This, therefore, makes privity irrelevant.
Breach of warranty then would seem to be in reality a form of
deceit. This shift towards a tortious concept of manufacturer's
liability is well illustrated by the history of liability for defective
vehicles. One starts with Winterbottom v. Wright where Baron
94 See, e.g., Note, 65 YALE L. J. 262, 267 (1955).
95 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). This case enunciated the rule
that one furnishing chattels to another owes no duty of care to a third party with
whom he is not in privity of contract.
96 See, Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1920);
Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal.2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938) (dictum).
97 Note, 65 YaE L. J. 262, 267 (1955).
98 Vandepitte v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Corp. of New York, [1933] A.C. 70 (P.C.).
99 Sixth Interim Report, Para. 50 (9).
100 (1954) 3 All E. R. 397 (C.A.).
101 (1954) 2 All E. R. 158 (Q.B.).
102 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944).
103 2 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1888).
104

WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs § 970 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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Alderson withheld liability by applying the strict rule of privity.
In doing so he said, "If we go one step beyond [privity], there is
no reason why we should not go fifty." In 1903 some of his
"fifty steps" were taken by a circuit court' 0 5 which drew a distinction, later repudiated in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
between products supplied specifically for the use of one person,
and those supplied for use by unknown persons. One finally
reaches MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' 0 6 in which Cardozo
anticipates by many years the English decision in Donoghue v.
Stevenson'0 7 by ruling that:
If the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made . . . [and]
. . . there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser ...

without new tests, then,

irrespective of contract, the manufacturer... is under a duty
to make it carefully.' 0 8

Nor does the trend appear to be stopping here. While MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. confines itself to negligently made
vehicles, it seems that its rule might equally well apply today to
negligently designed vehicles. 0 9
A number of other examples might also be chosen. In Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor 1 0 crops were sprayed from an airplane with a chemical compound which spread further than was
customary and caused damage to neighboring farms. The seller
of the spray was sued and the court said:
If one casts into the air a substance which he knows may do
damage to others, and in some circumstances will certainly do

so, principles of elementary justice, as well as the best public
policy require that he know how far the substance will carry
...and what damage it will do in the path of its journey, and
if he releases such a substance either from ignorance of, or in
indifference to the damage that may be done, the rule of strict
liability should be applied."'

This seems to be a situation where negligence and strict liability
are moving towards each other under the head of products liability. At one end then, one finds an increasing modification of
Winterbottom v. Wright amounting almost to a form of insur105

Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).

106 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
107 (1932) A.C. 562.
108 111 N.E. at 1053.
109 Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1956).
110 215 Ark 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
11
Id. at 827.
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ance based on control; 11 2 and, at the other, the idea that strict
liability is a matter, as Thayer has put it, of due care under the
circumstances.
Professor Feezer 1 3 poses the question: if the courts are moving towards a question of capacity to bear loss, what is the nature
of the judicial process involved? Are the courts merely extending old negligence principles, or are they evolving new concepts
of liability? The answer to this seems to be that they are extending old principles toward another old principle - that of strict
liability.
The question of capacity to bear loss will be dealt with more
fully later, but since in products liability the loss can be
shifted on to the customer via the price mechanism it may be
briefly discussed here. This use of the price mechanism was referred to by Judge Holt in Bridgman Russell v. Duluth:" 4
If a break occurs in the reservoir itself, or the principal mains,
the flood may utterly ruin an individual financially. In such a
case, even though negligence be absent, natural justice would
seem to demand that the enterprise, or what is really the same
thing, the whole community benefited by the enterprise, should
stand the loss rather than the individual: It is too heavy a burden upon one.

Many legal thinkers have become aware that strict products
liability eventually entails risk shifting, and much discussion has
prevailed as to whom is best suited to shift the risk - manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer. 1 5 Generally, of course, it will
be best to place the loss where the most pressure will be exerted
to keep down future losses. There is also another school of
thought whose members agree with the statement of Judge
Learned Hand that absolute civil liability is not the answer to
the problem, and that statutory prohibitions and penalties are
the true solution.
Dean Pound reviews the whole of the above tendency and sees
it as an element in the movement towards a service state. 1 6 The
Rylands v. Fletcher type case is legitimate, he says, on the
grounds of social interest in the general security, but he resents
Friedmann, Modern Trends in the Law of Torts, 1 MOD. L. REv. 39 (1937).
Feezer, Ability to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Tort
Cases, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 742, 743 (1930-31).
114 158 Minn. 509, 197 N.W. 971, 972 (1924).
115 Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MicH. L. REv.
494 (1936). Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products, 23
MiNN. L. REv. 585 (1939).
116 Pound, Law In the Service State: Freedom Versus Equality, 36 A.B.A.J. 977,
981 (1951).
112

113
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its extension to absolute liability grounded on the individual's
claim "that a full economic and social life [be] provided for him."
II.

STRICT LIABILITY AND STATUTE

In being critical of the use of negligence, res ipsa loquitur,
and nuisance to apply liability without fault, we should remember that judges are not legislators; and where legislatures are
dilatory, there may even be something praiseworthy in the
courts' use of these doctrines to reach what they consider is a
just result. Nevertheless, it would seem that it would be far
better for the legislature to expressly set out the law and in a
number of instances this has been done. Perhaps the most outstanding example is the legislation concerning Workmen's Compensation.
The early Workmen's Compensation Acts were confined to
what seems to be a basis of "ultrahazardous" acts; 117 but, by
the time Professor Smith wrote his definitive article on the subject in 1913, there were more American states which did not so
restrict the law than those which did."" There has been a growing tendency on the part of courts to so construe these acts as to
impose strict liability on employers. A recent example of this is
University of Denver v. Nemeth' 9 where a student football
player, injured in spring football practice, was held to be "within the course of employment" - the employment being a totally
dissociated job for $50 a month performing tasks around the
tennis courts. The job was dependent on his playing football.
This, of course, is in accord with the increasing protection
afforded the employee.
Although some important employee groups are not covered
by this legislation, they are assisted in other ways. Thus, railway workers are protected to some extent by the Federal Employers Liability Act, which abrogated such devices as the
"fellow servant rule" and contributory negligence. The Jones
Act of 1915 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 do much
the same thing for seamen. In, 1926, Professor Burdick referred
to this trend as:
[E]vidence of a very general legislative policy to get away
from fault as the basis of liability, and to make a business insure
against loss to its employees. This would seem to be but one of

117 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 B. 61 Vict., c.37.
118 Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Acts, 27 IIv.L. REv.235, 367 (1913).
119 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953).
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the manifestations of the modern trend towards collectivism,
as opposed to the individualism
of the eighteenth and first half
120
of the nineteenth centuries.

Some writers would place Workmen's Compensation and strict
liability in quite distinct categories. Perhaps the most outspoken
has been Larson in his book on Workmen's Compensation.''
He says that "almost every major error that can be observed in
the development of compensation law ... can be traced [most
commonly] to the importation of tort ideas." He goes on to point
out that only damage which produces disability is actionable
(and even then only on a "bare minimum standard of life" scale)
and that this differentiates it from tort recovery. The answer to
this seems to be that this criticism goes only to the question of
damages in the tort field, and not to the principle of strict
liability itself. Even Larson concedes that "Workmen's Compensation, far from being a violation of moral principle, is in
fact the only morally satisfactory solution ... once you concede
122
that morality has a group as well as an individual aspect."'
This is the very essence of strict liability-it subjugates the nonculpability of the individual actor to the welfare of the group.
The example of the above compensatory statutes has been
followed in an ever-increasing number of fields, and usually the
social goal is effected not by saying that the defendant "shall
be strictly liable," but by making the defendant conclusively or
presumptively guilty of negligence or nuisance. Thus, the old
forms of liability are utilized to play a different role. There is
little that can be said of those statutes which make proof of
certain acts conclusive of the commission of a tort, 23 except
that like all fields of tort they are limited by rules of causation.
In the case of those statutes which create a presumption 1 24 of a
tort upon proof of the act, the question is more difficult. In some
cases a court will say that the presumption may be rebutted by
mere proof that due care was used, while in others the court
will demand more affirmative evidence, in which event (as in
"conclusive" statutes) the effect is creation of strict liability. This
is particularly true where breach of a statute is considered
negligence per se by the court.
120

BuRDiCK, ToRTs 17-18 (4th ed. 1926).
1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1.20, 2.20, 2.40, 2.50 (1952).
122 Id., § 2.20.
123 IowA CODE § 1370 (1927). One suggesting to a workman that he reject
workmen's compensation benefits is guilty of fraud. MIcH. COMP. LAws § 4825
(1915). Member of a family driving car is conclusive of consent.
124 IMI.Laws 51st Gen. Assembly 1919, at 678. GA. CODE. ANN. § 2780 (1914)
(proof of collision between car and train).
121
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Such finding of negligence per se often results where breach
of a criminal statute is involved. Thus, in Stehle v. JaegarAutomatic Machine Co.,' 2 5 a child was injured during employment
which was in contravention of a statute. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that it was never a question for the jury
whether one violating a statute exercised reasonable care in so
doing. There has to be a finding of negligence. The question
arises whether a criminal statute which makes no mention of
civil liability is nevertheless impliedly intended to create such
concurrent remedy; and, if so, by what means. Thus, the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938126 says that violation by
a manufacturer shall constitute a misdemeanor, and such policy
regarding the public as a whole has been approved on a number
of occasions. In United States v. Dotterweich'1 7 the Court said:
"In the interest of the larger good [such legislation] puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent
but standing in responsible relation to a public danger."' 2 The
ability to approach statutes in this fashion is very useful to the
courts; a "pure food" statute for example is a better source of a
civil action than a warranty, for it does not suffer from any
privity limitation, and it survives the death of the injured
party. 129 Even so, is any further extension justifiable? The
dilemma seems to be this: the courts in civil cases do not wish
to ignore the publicly expressed will of the legislature for fear
of inconsistency; 130 yet, in order not to do so, they are called
upon to equate that conduct which violates a criminal statute
with that which constitutes negligence. Thayer says that the
analogy should be to public nuisance, and that the individual
may only recover when he has suffered some special damage
peculiar to himself. 13 ' It is submitted, however, that the question
of damage is not the crux of the matter, but that the central
issue is one of duty.
But, is there any effective analogy between the duty of care
based on the standard of the "reasonable man," and the "duty"
incumbent upon, say, a retailer of food under a "pure.- food"
125
126
127
128

225 Pa. 348, 74 At. 215 (1909).
52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 333 (1952).
320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
Reasoning approved in 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593,-596

(1951).
129

130
181

Kress and Co. v.Lindsey, 262 Fed. 311 (5th Cir. 1931).
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 I-IAv. L. Rav. 317 (1914).
Id. at 326-28.
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statute? Only if there is would there appear to be any justification for making contravention of a statute negligence per se.
Those cases which hold such contravention to be mere evidence
of negligence seem to have avoided one inconsistency only to
be faced with another, for this is the equivalent of saying to
the jury, "Well, the legislature might be right, but we leave it
to you to contradict them if you wish."
As to the relation between that type of statute, the breach of
which creates negligence per se and ordinary common law
negligence, two main points should be considered. First, there
does seem to be some form of standard implicit in some criminal
statutes akin to the common law standard of negligence. This
of course is the standard which the legislature has set within the
statute itself; such a standard, or duty, is breached by those who
violate the statute. Secondly, however, there is disparity, and
this disparity lies not in the question of standards, but in the
question of causation. Breach of a criminal statute cannot per
se cause damage and, therefore, the use of the criminal statute
breach to impose civil liability without an inquiry into the causal
chain extends civil liability beyond that imposed by common
law negligence. This factor was recognized in Faulk v. Fingleman'3 2 where an automobile was struck by a fire truck and
pushed forward into the plaintiff who was injured as a result. The
car had been parked in violation of a city ordinance, and its
owner was brought into the lawsuit as a defendant. The court
found in favor of the automobile owner on the ground that
breach of the city ordinance was merely a condition and not a
contributing cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Consider also
Brown v. Shyne,133 a case involving the practicing of medicine
without a license in contravention of the New York State Public
Health Law, in which Lehman, J. said:
True, if the defendant had not practiced medicine in this state,
he could not have injured the plaintiff, but the protection which
the statute was intended to provide was against risk of injury
by the unskilled or careless practitioner, and, unless the plaintiff's injury was caused by carelessness or lack of skill, the de-

fendant's failure
to obtain a license was not connected with
34
the injury.1

One must recognize, therefore, that the term negligence per se
as used in conjunction with a violation of criminal statutes bears
132
133
134

268 Mass. 524, 168 N.E. 89 (1929).
242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926).
Id. at 198.
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no true relation to common law negligence. It is merely a means
used to apply strict liability in the hope that the use of familiar
terminology will mitigate resistance to a relatively radical concept.

III.

THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS

Chapter 21, section 519 of the Restatement reads:
Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or
chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by
the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous,
although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm. 135

The first thing to note about this statement is that it is not in
accord with English common law on the subject of strict liability
which, as Lord Justice Scott pointed out in Read v. Lyons and
Co.,'-8 concerns itself more with acts than activities. This section
of the Restatement, on the other hand, seems quite clearly to be
based on a theory of risk. This is illustrated by the fact that the
Restatement goes beyond English law in ignoring the place where
the activity is carried on. On the other hand, the Restatement is
narrower than the English rule in emphasizing the extreme
danger which cannot be eliminated even by the utmost care.
Restatement section 520 defines "ultra-hazardous" as follows:
(a) Necessarily involves the risk of serious harm to the person,
land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the
exercise of the utmost care, and
(b) is not a matter of common usage.
The requirement of "common usage" is probably drawn from
Lord Cairns' original modification of Blackburn's rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, and is justified, as one writer put it: 3 7 "[because] if the activity is one carried on by a larger proportion of
persons in the community, the incidence of harm and the incidence of responsibility are so nearly coextensive that nothing
would be gained by imposing strict liability." Professor Goodhart has said" 8' that both the English limitation of "natural user"
and the United States limitation of "common usage" are breeding grounds of doubt and ought to be replaced by the criterion
of "reasonableness." With this it is difficult to agree. As courts
185
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RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 519 (1938).

(1945) 1 L.B. 216, 228.
Note, 61 H.Av. L. REv. 515, 520 (1947).
Goodhart, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Volume III: A comparison Between American and English Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 265, 272 (1941).
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become more and more aware of the value of statistical surveys
and kindred aids, it seems that it will be far easier to give content
to the term "common usage" than to the term "reasonable."
Section 520 (h) states that what is ultra-hazardous is a
matter of law for the court to decide. This statement is sometimes ignored despite the decisions upholding it in Green v.
General Petroleum Corporation13 9 and Luthringer v. Moore.140
This is unwise, for to deprive the court of its discretion here is to
remove from it a powerful instrument of policy and consistency,
and replace it with the vagaries of jury decisions. If such trend
were to continue, those who look for progress will definitely have
to look to legislation, for strict liability at common law will remain a "wilderness of single instances."
Under section 521 performance of a public duty exempts a
party from liability under section 519.141 This has been judicially
doubted on both sides of the Atlantic. An English case, Smeaton
v. Illford Corp., 42 inquired whether a public authority is always
outside the scope of strict liability, or whether it is only prima
facie excluded, subject to rebuttal. In the United States, courts
have said: 141 "The advantages to society of a public work are not
so great as to require that private citizens suffer damage without
compensation."
Judicial disapproval in England and the United States is again
evident in dealing with section 522, which states that the intervention of a third person, animal, or force of nature will not
exempt one from liability. In England, to take as one example,
Rickards v. Lothian,14 it was held that strict liability will not
be imposed if an act of God intervenes. It also appears that
courts in the United States have not been loath to ignore the
section. 14 5 Here again this rejection of excuse by the Restatement is completely consistent with their risk theory of liability
in this field. In fact this is expressly admitted so far as section
522 is concerned.

139 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
140 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1938).
141 This embodies the common law rule on the subject. See, e.g., Nelson v.
McKenzie-Hague Co., 192 Minn. 180, 256 N.W. 96 (1934).
142 (1954) Ch. 450 (dictum).
143 Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng. Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d
591, 596 (1951).
144 (1913) A.C. 263.
145 Cohen v. Brockton Savings Bank, 320 Mass. 690, 71 N.E.2d 109 (1947);
Bratton v. Rudnick, 285 Mass. 556, 186 N.E. 669 (1933).
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From the above survey of Chapter 21 of the Restatement of
Torts it should be clear that it is not in accord with existing law
either in the United States or in England, so far as strict liability
is concerned. However, it does represent a fresh attempt to break
new ground by its broad formulation of principle. It is wider
than English law in that it has no requirement of escape, nor is
it confined to possessors of land. For this reason it has freed
itself of much of the confusion with negligence and nuisance
which has been such a burden.
IV.

THE

BASIS

AND PoLICY OF STRICT LIABILITY

When quasi-contract (or perhaps it should be called restitution) first appeared in the law, its anomalous position aroused
much comment, for it seemed to spoil the erstwhile complacent
division of civil law into "contract" and "torts." Much the same
charge has been levelled at the principle of strict liability. Thus
Roscoe Pound states that it should be kept in a completely
separate category for the sake of coherence. 1 46 He claims that
it may be put on the totally dissociated basis of the "social
interest in the general security." However, we will later see that
he modified this view. Again, Professor Smith' 4 7 suggests that a
definition of tort would become feasible if it could all be grouped
under a "fault" heading. To do this, he would place in a completely separate category - under the heading of absolute liability - not only cases which have been considered as torts, but
also those cases which are at present labelled "quasi-contract."
The whole group would then be called "liability imposed (or
created) by law." In the light of the confusion between strict
liability and other torts one may agree that some form of separation is essential, but it is by no means certain that a separation
from the law of tort(s) as a whole is the solution. Presuming,
then, for the sake of brevity that one is confined to a framework
of tortious liability, one may ask what lies behind this liability
in the absence of fault?
So far as the continent of Europe is concerned, there are
various ideas as to the concept of "culpa."'14 Savatier, in his
authoritative work Traite de la Responsibilite Civile, suggests
POUND, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 144 (1922).
147 Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes on Classification, 30
HARv. L. REV. 241,254 (1916).
146

148

Id.

at 259. See also, Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in Modern Civil

and Common Lmv (Part I), 16 ILL. L. REV. 163, 268; (Part I1), 17 ILL. L. Ra,.
187, 416 (1920-23).
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with typical Gallic fervour that the rejection of fault liability
1 49
would lead to the "moral decadence of the whole of society."'

Takayanagi mentions three main schools of thought on the continent which attempt to justify strict liability. The Historical
School may be dealt with very briefly, for it merely says that
early Germanic law was based on such a principle. As Takayanagi rightly points out, historical fact is in itself no justification.
Followers of the natural law say rather dogmatically that strict
liability is a precept of natural justice. Often, the Natural Law
School adds that strict liability is sound sense because of two innocent parties, the actor is more "guilty" than the person harmed.
Takayanagi dismisses this because to him "there cannot be
degrees of non-culpa."' 150 But there is a "feeling" for something
in such a theory which should not be lightly dismissed. While
perhaps "guilt" is an inaccurate word to apply to the relative
status of one who acts as opposed to one who is a passive recipient, one can see that from a viewpoint of sheer practicality it
is vitally important to decide upon whom the loss should be
thrown, and equally important to understand that such a decision is strongly influenced by policy considerations. Viewed in
this extra-legal light there seems to be no reason why the party
who has disturbed the "status quo" should not also be called upon to pay the price of stopping the disturbance. It is easy to suspect that this idea has tainted the policy of those who allow
civil actions "presumptive" or "conclusive" of negligence to
supplement breach of strict liability criminal statutes.
A third body of continental jurists comprise the Formalistic
School. Adherents to this school say that all compensation must
be based on the same legal ground. "Culpa" is not always a requisite of liability, while causation always is; therefore, causation
is the ground of liability. Thus, strict liability is justified. The
fallacy of this, says Professor Takayanagi, is that although
"culpa" may not be required in some cases, it is possible that
some other additional prerequisite besides the causation of
damage (e.g., ultra-hazardous activity) be present.
In England, as opposed to civil law Europe, it seems to have
always been a characteristic feature of the jurisprudence to
utilize rather than to analyze. Sir Henry Maine's statement that
"there are some things which it is better to describe than to
define" seems to have been taken much to heart and this is
149

SAVATIER, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSmLITE CiviLE 327 (2d ed. 1951).

150

Id. See also, 17 ILL. L. REV. at 424.
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particularly true of the concept of strict liability. It has already
been shown that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was so riddled
with exceptions as to make people like Sir John Salmond say
that there was not much left of the rule at all; and, since the
decision in Read v. Lyons,1 51 the practical value of it seems to
be so much on the wane that philosophical speculation is not
likely to be further aroused. One author
has made a very in152
teresting analysis of this situation:
In the United States the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher from
the beginning failed to win wide favor, and was never applied

uniformly. Nevertheless, it appears in the Restatement of Torts
under the guise of liability for "ultra-hazardous activities" and
there is increasing acceptance of it in this form. It is thus a
pertinent comment on legal thinking in England and the United
States that as this doctrine waxes in strength in the United
States it wanes in England [referring to Read v. Lyons]; that as
the need for some principle of social insurance becomes increasingly apparent in both societies, the land where free enterprise
is so strongly stressed progresses steadily toward such an idea,
while in the England of the National Insurance Act . . . the
judges of the highest court in the land turn their faces against
it....

Asked why some jurisdictions still cling to fault law, Ehrenzweig 53 has explained it in terms of the primitive but tenacious
desire for revenge, which is rationalized by society in terms of
fault.'5 4 He would prefer to place it on a theory of "typicality"
liability for all harm which is the "typical" result of the act
in question. He states that the English rule relating to damages
for breach of contract, laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale' 55
by relating the foreseeability test to the time of making the
contract rather than to its breach, "has made a significant contribution to the understanding . . . of non-fault liability." Although this opinion in its stress on the objective nature of
typicality is fortified by the later English decision in Victoria
Laundries Ltd. v. Newman Industries5 6 which talks of "constructive foreseeability," the analogy is not too effective, for the
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale -in part rests upon information
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[1946] 2 All E.R. 471 (H.L.).
Baker, An Eclipse of Fault Liability? 40 VA. L. Rev. 273, 275 (1954).
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EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WrrIHOUT FAULT 53-54 (1951).

154 He thinks the real answer is to make all persons insure against liability, and
to develop through that to a system of loss insurance, irrespective of legal liability.
155 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
156 [1949] 2 K.B. 528.
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communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant, 5 7 which is
peculiar to such dual relationships, and in part on damages
arising in the "natural course of events," which is no clearer
than the present tort rule. It seems that Ehrenzweig is forcing
his argument to an extreme when he suggests that his contractual
analogy is strengthened, inasmuch as one may imply a contract
between the entrepreneur and the state to allow the dangerous
activity. He does admit, 58 however, that what is typical may be
a difficult question, and this seems to be the weak point of his
whole interesting scheme. It is difficult to think of a complete
definition of "typical" just as it is difficult to comprehensively
define "foreseeable," or "with due care," or "causative factor."
Roscoe Pound says' 5 9 that fault liability only has a part to
play in a legal system in the early stage, "when the moral and
the legal are indentified"; and that the law of today is not dealing with "will" but with the "reasonable expectations [of modern
society] arising out of conduct, relation and situation."1 60 Interests lying behind the 19th century emphasis on fights are now
the important thing. These claims are a matter of social interest
and thus the end of law becomes "the satisfaction of as many
human demands as we can, with the least sacrifice of other demands. This . . . we may call the socialization of law."' 16' This
distinction between the old emphasis on rights and the new
emphasis on interests seems sometimes to be over-fine. It might
well be suggested that a "fight" is merely another word for a
legally recognized interest, and that, therefore, when Pound says
the emphasis has shifted to interests based on reasonable expectations, all he means is that the nature of the right has changed
from one emphasizing the individual to one emphasizing the
group. One can see why he decries rights, however, for in many
instances the word "right" has been evoked as a kind of utterly
ambiguous two-edged weapon by both sides, those who attack
absolute liability on the ground that it interferes with the right
of the enterprising person to expand, and those who use it to
defend absolute liability on the ground that it is conducive to the
protection of the rights of others. One must agree with Dean
& FIFooT, CONTRACTS 492 (1953).
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159 POUND, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 144 (1922).
160 Id. at 189.
161 Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV.
L. Rav. 195, 226 (1914). For a modification of his view see, Pound, Law in the
Service State: Freedom versus Equality, 36 A.B.A.I. 977 (1950).
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Pound when he sees law today occupying a more positive role
than formerly, in that it is trying to shape human relations as well
as merely proscribing them. This "social engineering" is implicit
in one court's statement some ten years ago, "even if there is no
negligence, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
where it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market."' 2
Thus far, the more hybrid theories which do not seem to fall
into any clear category have been discussed. There do appear,
however, to be three considerations basic to strict liability. The
first is control. Since the instrumentality is in the defendant's
sole control it is up to him to take the blame if it gets out of
control. It was this consideration that strongly influenced Mr.
Justice Blackburn in Rylands v. Fletcher, and it is this thread
which runs through the succeeding English cases.' 6 3 This theory
also accounts for the warped use of "res ipsa loquitur," and is
expressed in decisions like Prentissv. National Airlines. Furthermore, Professor Friedmann'" states that as the law develops
there is an increasing unity between nuisance, negligence, and
Rylands v. Fletcher type cases, dependent on control, from which
is implied foreseeability and duty. He, like Pound, thinks the
extension of strict liability is due to the emphasis being placed
on social situations, but unlike Pound he talks not of interests,
but of duties arising from those situations. The real change
seems to lie more in a stress on society rather than the individual.
The second major theory is that of risk - a lawful act or
activity involving danger, undertaken at the actor's risk. This
is the basis of Baron Bramwell's dissent in Rylands v. Fletcher,
and of65Section 521 of the Restatement of Torts. As one writer
says:1
Some activities, when carried on without negligence, are so
essential that they must be carried on somewhere, yet the risk
of damage may be great nevertheless. To require the actor to

bear the burden of any loss he incurs without prohibiting his
activity may be the most satisfactory means of balancing the
social interests, and the interests of the actor and of the injured
person.
The idea that there is nothing unlawful about an activity which
brings absolute liability down on the head of the actor seems to
162 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
163 Cf., Kelly, C.B., in Box v. Jubb, [1879] 4 Ex. 76.
164 Friedmann, Modern Trends in the Law of Torts, 1 MOD. L. REv. 39 (1937).
165 Carpenter, The Doctrine of Green v. General Petroleum Corporation, 5 So.
CAL. L. REv. 263, 271 (1932).
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have had much to do with the gradual decadence of the strange
theory that because "the King can do no wrong" he should also
be exempted from tort liability. In England, the error in this was
recognized by the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947,166 and the
Federal Torts Claims Act 1 67 permits certain tort claims to be
brought against the United States government.
Finally, one may note that in lieu of strict liability, some
jurisdictions apply a stringent duty of care. The outstanding
weakness of this theory seems to be that if one places the standard of care too high, negligence ceases to be based on fault. In
other words, this theory is perhaps more to be attacked for its
detrimental effect on negligence than for its efficacy as a policy
of strict liability.
In dissenting in Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor,168 Smith,
J. opposed strict liability because, "I can hardly see the point at
which its application may logically be said to end." This is no
cogent argument. The answer is that it cannot end because
society, to survive, needs constant change, and legal systems must
change with it or perish. In other words, just as fault is not
the end, so strict liability will not be. "Yet in the course of progress we cannot wholly avoid rough classifications of conduct
... .If the moral notion that links fault to liability must to
some extent be violated, our position must not be interpreted as
the abandonment of an ideal; it is but a new recognition of a
human limitation from which human law cannot be free."'6 9
What this means is that while fault may be pre-eminent now,
there is no need to regard strict liability, with its emphasis on the
group, as socialism rearing its ugly head. Given time it seems
perfectly feasible that while compensation irrespective of fault
will be the order of the day, liability will be once more dependent
on fault. Possibly the key to such a development which would
mete out justice to both actor and sufferer is some system of
comprehensive insurance. Strict liability is by no means a static
concept. At present it seems to be moving toward an insurance
principle, which in turn may be modified back toward a fault
idea. Thus, the writer is compelled to think that the risk theory
of strict liability is the most valid, and it is consistent with the
insurance principle which will now be examined.
10 & 11 Geo.6, c. 44 (1946-47).
62 STAT. 933 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1952).
168 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
169 Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HA.v. L. REv. 954, 978 (1918).
166
167
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Insurance and Strict Liability
Justice Holmes once suggested that the only alternative in a
negligence case was to place the blame on one party or the
other. It is now being recognized that there is a wider alternative than this - to distribute losses widely via insurance (state
or otherwise) or the mechanism of the market. In other words,
as Morris points out, 170 the risk theory has been supplemented by
the important criterion that losses should only be shifted "from
an inferior to a superior risk bearer." Or as two other writers
have stated the problem:
[T]here can scarcely be any doubt that the possibilities
opened up by insurance for distributing losses over society,
and for shielding individual defendants from the full impact
of liability have been important factors in producing a climate
171
of opinion in which extension of liability is inevitable.

This statement seemingly cannot be disputed. In one instance a
study was made of jury verdicts and it was found that in 3,330
automobile accident cases, 2,386 resulted in verdicts for the
plaintiff. It is permissible to suggest that insurance is facilitating
the adoption of strict liability in two ways. First, it is encouraging
juries to extend old principles in the sure knowledge that no one
is going to suffer - other than those who wish for a logical,
coherent legal structure. Second, it is one of the strongest supports for those who urge the extension of expressed strict liability,
for by this means those who urge the "moralizing" of law are
placated by the fact that liability is seen purely in terms of everyone paying a necessary part of the "cost of production."'1 2 The
de facto approach - the use of old concepts - has a number
of ramifications.
In the light of the jury behaviour noted above, insurance
companies will in many cases settle out of court without regard
to fault, in the hope that they will come out. more lightly than if
they allowed the jury to come to their almost inevitable verdict.
In this concealed fashion the principle of strict liability is increasingly creeping in practically, if not in theory.'17
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On the other hand, the unwillingness of the courts to recognize
the effect of insurance in some instances is unreal, as where they
have prevented an unemancipated minor from suing his parents,
or one spouse from suing another. Where there is insurance
present, connubial or domestic bliss would seemingly not be impaired, and hence the rationale for the legal disability disappears.' 7 4 It is interesting to note that this is being recognized
in a limited number of instances. Thus, in Dunlap v. Dunlap'7 5
a child successfully sued his father, who was protected by liability insurance. The New Hampshire court, in finding in favor of
the plaintiff, was called upon to consider the forceful statement
that insurance could not create liability where none existed before. Resolving the question, the court pointed out that the
question ought to be viewed more as the removal of an impairment to the enforcement of a right - in this case the removal of
the threat of family discord, due to insurance. There are other
cases to the7 same effect, both on child plaintiffs, 1 76 and spouse

plaintiffs.

17

In Rogers v. Butler1 7 the Tennessee court attacked in similar
fashion the rule of governmental immunity from negligence suits.
A county was held liable for the negligence of a school-bus
driver for any amount up to the maximum liability insurance
coverage. The court expressly based itself on the presence of
such insurance. The immunity of charities have been considered
in a similar fashion. In Wendt v. Servite Fathers'7 9 the court said,
"We hold that where insurance exists, and provides a fund from
the
which tort liability may be collected so as not to impair
80
trust fund, the defense of immunity is not available.'

174 The only justification might be that it presents an unrivaled opportunity for
collusion. Cf., Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1922),
where the court talks of "a rald on the insurance company," and see generally,
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When considerations of this sort are examined, many object
to them because they believe that dependence on insurance is
going to lead to conduct by the insured with little or no regard
for his neighbour. Too often the whole thing is looked at solely
from the position of the insured, forgetting that the insurance
company has a considerable interest in reducing the number
of effective damage suits. Indeed the zeal with which they pursue
this policy may be such as to compel future legislators to place
any comprehensive insurance scheme in the hands of the state,
rather than the aggregate of private companies. The situation
was highlighted in Vance v. Burke' 8 ' where the insurance company was "hot" on the lack of cooperation of the insured, while
the only interest of the state was to secure financial aid to the
victim. Moreover, an added difficulty of leaving it to private
insurance would be the danger of being injured by one who was
not insured, although in New York, insurance companies are
combatting this by offering policies covering such an eventuality.
Alternatively, one could compel all persons to carry compulsory
liability insurance, as New York (since 1956) and Massachusetts (since 1925) have done with motor vehicle operators. This
would tend to exempt persons from financial liability in
negligence proceedings.
In all that has been said, the thread running through is the
increasing possibilities created by the use of insurance. Recognized by courts and thinkers alike, it presents (despite some of
the difficulties mentioned) new vistas for strict liability.
Whatever the fear may have been in the beginning that industry
and enterprise might be overburdened with catastrophic losses,
insurance has long since removed much of its sting; and where
the idea of liability without fault is accepted, it is not surprising
that liability in excess of fault has been gaining ground . ...
[T]he drift has been slowly but surely toward the view that
unforeseeability of consequences
is not in itself a sufficient
82
reason for denying liability.'

What is a sufficient reason remains to be discovered. Meanwhile
strict liability seems to be still gathering impetus, both openly
and in a variety of guises, without any indication of reversal.
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CONCLUSION

The whole tenor of this article has been to show that in whatever guise it appears, strict liability is on the march. Having
attempted to indicate some of the ways in which it is gaining
strength, it does not seem necessary in concluding to review
the individual sections. In general, however, it would seem that
in the light of this growth insurance may become an outstanding
factor in our civil law.
While the author believes that a trend toward comprehensive
insurance seems predictable, it is recognized that such a forecast
is based on this author's analysis of the area coverd by this
article. Furthermore, opposition by the legal profession to such
a tendency seems to be inevitable since then their task in the
negligence field would thereby be reduced to that of mere fact
finders. Indeed, legal representation will perhaps disappear in
certain instances where technical investigators can do the same
job with equal efficiency. In the ultimate, therefore, one can
only hope that an analysis such as has been attempted here
might provide some little food for thought.

